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Abstract: The economic concept of negative externalities is the dominant frame in 
environmental policies. Revisiting environmental damage with a sociological approach, I 
show how the process of externalities definition and internalisation is a political process in 
which a public is constituted and common problems are collectively defined and addressed. 
In particular, I highlight the presence in this process of two kinds of uncertainty which have to 
be dealt with: epistemic uncertainty and moral uncertainty. Keeping these two forms of 
uncertainty analytically separated is useful in order to understand the limits of the market as 
a way to internalize environmental externalities and to analyse in their specificities the 
different types of translation, mediation and composition which are needed in order to create 
the conditions for a truly inclusive and democratic public deliberation on environmental 
damage and its reparation.  
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Terms such as “environmental crisis”, “environmental issue” or simply “environment” have 
gained currency for indicating a collection of problems, deprived of any stable and 
univocal criterion of inclusion: climate change, pollution, natural and technological risks, 
toxic waste, species extinction, exhaustion of natural resources. In order to address these 
different manifestations of the environment as a public problem, neoclassical economics 
resorts to just one category of analysis: negative externalities.  
This capacity to reduce a wide variety of problems to their lowest common denominator 
is a point of strength of neoclassical economics: it goes with the high generalizability of its 
tools. Nonetheless, this is also a point of weakness. In fact, the lowest common 
denominator guaranteeing generalizability is defined by assuming that environmental 
problems emerge because of the absence of markets for environmental goods. 
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Accordingly, the solutions envisioned are either the introduction of some mechanism meant 
to amend this failure of the market or the attribution of property rights over environmental 
goods. This approach prevents neoclassical economics from taking into account the 
relevance of two distinctive aspects of environmental damage that challenge the 
appropriateness of exclusively relying on economic tools when dealing with environmental 
problems.  
First, we have to consider the epistemic uncertainty surrounding environmental 
processes which account for environmental degradation. We cannot always identify the 
specific causes of incidences of environmental damage, because we are confronted with 
complex systems which involve complex social and ecological interdependencies. 
Second, we must acknowledge that there are different ways to value the environment, 
some of them quantifiable, others not so.  
In both cases, the issue of incommensurability, that is, the absence of a common unit 
of measurement across different phenomena, emerges as central, thus putting into 
question the capacity of economic tools alone to address environmental concerns: “from 
an ecological point of view, the economy lacks a common standard of measurement, 
because we do not know how to give present values to future, uncertain and irreversible 
contingencies” (Martinez-Alier, 1995: 76). 
The aim of this paper is to bring into the debate on environmental damage1 an 
analysis of both epistemic uncertainty and moral complexity and thereby to emphasize the 
place of incommensurability in public decisions concerned with the environment. The 
concept of negative externalities can be a useful heuristic in discussing environmental 
damage, as long as “instead of focusing on ‘missing markets’ as causes of allocative 
disgraces, we focus on the creative power that missing markets have” (Martinez-Alier et 
al., 1998: 283).   
The paper is organised as follows: in the first paragraph I present the neoclassical 
approach to environmental damage. In the second, I present a critical standpoint, internal 
to the economic debate, addressing the limits of this conceptual frame. I show how the 
issues raised in this debate open a window of opportunity for a cross-fertilisation with a 
sociological perspective. Developing this line of reasoning, I discuss externality situations 
as “problematic situations” (Dewey, 1938) marked by epistemic uncertainty (§3) and moral 
uncertainty (§4). In particular, I address the question of how these two kinds of uncertainty 
can be reduced so as to make collective decisions on environmental problems possible, 
while still guaranteeing their inclusiveness, in terms of acknowledging plural ways to know 
and value the environment.  
                                               
1
 The notion of environmental damage I will discuss throughout the paper is that of the environmental damage 
understood or defined in terms of negative externality.  
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In the neoclassical economic frame, goods exchanged in the market are the only way 
through which the materiality of the world is taken into account. On the one hand, 
consumption is considered as a process of destruction, so that no material support is left 
after consumption (that is: no waste exists). On the other hand, the so called “free goods” 
(air, water) are non-market goods and thus basically not relevant to the economic 
analysis. In this sense, we can say that the sphere of “the economic” has been built as 
independent and separate not only from the sphere of “the political” but as also from the 
environment.2 As a consequence, neoclassical economic theory is intrinsically indifferent 
to the processes assuring the reproduction of the environmental and material conditions 
guaranteeing the existence of human beings (Luzzati, 2005).  
Starting in the 1960s, in a climate of growing political and social awareness of the 
environmental crisis (Carson, 1962; Commoner, 1971), economics has been abruptly 
confronted with the necessity of taking the environment into account, first of all through 
the issue of the exhaustion of natural resources (Club of Rome, 1972) and then through 
the issue of the environmental damage caused by industrial pollution (Boulding, 1966; 
Krutilla, 1967).  
It is on these premises that a specific branch of economics addressing environmental 
problems, known as “environmental economics”, has developed. The key analytical 
concept around which this field of investigation is structured is that of externalities. The 
concept of externality is not specific to environmental issues: it is used to define situations 
where the activities of one (or more than one) economic agent(s) have consequences on 
the economic well-being of other agents, without any kind of exchange or transaction 
occurring between them.3 When these indirect consequences increase well-being, 
externalities are qualified as “positive”; otherwise, they are qualified as “negative”. 
Pollution is the classic example of a negative externality, while public health policies 
produce positive externalities. Since there is no reward (or gain) for those producing 
positive external effects or sanctions for those causing negative external effects, 
externalities cause the market to fail to achieve an efficient allocation of resources. In fact, 
when externalities are present, private and social costs diverge, so that profit maximizing 
decisions are socially inefficient because prices do not carry all the relevant information. 
We speak then of negative externalities if the social cost of an activity is higher than its 
private cost.  
                                               
2
 On the construction of the “economic” as a separate sphere see Dumont (1977), Hirschman (1977) and, in 
particular, Polanyi (1944) whose analysis stresses the negative consequences on the environmental equilibria 
of this fictional separation of the economic sphere. 
3
 For a detailed account of the history of the concept of externality see Papandreou (1994). 
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Let us take the example of a factory that produces the good X, maximizing its profit. In 
order to decide the optimum level of production, the cost of production has to be taken 
into account in the economic calculus. If the factory can dispose freely of its waste in the 
environment, without paying for it, the cost of pollution is not taken into account when 
deciding the optimum level of production. As a result, the volume of production 
maximizing the producer’s private profit is higher than that guaranteeing the social 
optimum. 
The solution proposed for this market failure is that of internalizing externalities by 
integrating them into the economic calculus of maximizing actors. Different instruments 
have been proposed in order to achieve this goal: giving a price to free environmental 
resources, taxing the polluter, introducing regulation, attributing property rights over 
environmental resources. These instruments are applied in order to correct price signals, 
so that individual optimizing decisions are aligned with the socially optimum resources 
allocation. This frame of analysis is the major contribution of economic theory to the field 
of environmental policies. 
In the solutions neoclassical economics provides for the internalization of 
environmental externalities the key issue is determining the social optimum. In order to 
determine the social optimum, it is necessary to set some optimum level of pollution, since 
a level of zero pollution is considered unrealistic. This optimum level of pollution is set 
according to a comparison between the costs and benefits of pollution and de-pollution. 
The problem is represented as a problem of allocation of scarce resources. To 
summarize, pollution causes damage but de-pollution implies costs. Resources are 
scarce, so those resources to be invested in the protection or restoration of the 
environment cannot be used for the production of other socially valuable goods. The 
internalization of environmental negative externalities results in solving a problem of cost-
benefit analysis applied to pollution and de-pollution.  
This approach oversimplifies the nature of environmental problems and raises a great 
many critiques. First of all, the redistributive effects of environmental policies designed 
according to this model are not taken into account. The unequal allotting of costs and 
benefits among different individuals, social categories, present and future generations, 
geographical areas is not considered in the decision process (Vallée, 2002: 80). Important 
issues of equity linked to the environment go completely unaddressed in this frame. The 
only social goal taken into account in the neoclassical approach is that of efficiency in 
allocating scarce resources. But more is at stake when deciding about the environment, 
i.e. other relevant social goals such as, for example, equity (Godard, 2003).  
Second, the economic marginal analysis cannot usefully apply to systems as complex 
as those found in nature. A marginal increment in pollution does not necessarily result in a 
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correspondingly marginal injury to the environment. There may be a tipping point beyond 
which the environment can absorb no more pollution and irreversible damage is thus 
inflicted on ecological systems (Sagoff, 1981: 1393). This brings to the fore the difficulty of 
valuating environmental damage through a cost-benefit approach. The cost-benefit 
method implies that we have full information on the consequences of an action, as well as 
a clear definition of cause-effect mechanisms, which is rarely the case when the 
environment is involved. Moreover, expressing irreversible losses in monetary terms is 
quite controversial. Equally controversial is the valuation of environmental benefits.  
The valuation of environmental costs and benefits has become one of the main topics 
of research in environmental economics. Economists define the social value of a good 
according to the intensity of consumers’ preference as expressed by people willingness to 
pay. When markets are absent, as is the case of environmental goods, preferences 
cannot be observed through consumers’ actual choices.  Economists must then rely on 
methods such as contingent valuation: individuals are directly asked through a survey how 
much they would be willing to pay for a good or accept as compensation for its loss in a 
hypothetical market. 
These methods give rise to internal difficulties which lead to sophisticated attempts to 
solve them.4 But the emphasis on the need for monetary valuation in environmental 
policies is based on a set of misleading assumptions. First, behind the importance given 
to the valuation of environmental goods there is the idea that well-being consists of the 
satisfaction of preferences, so that we can ascertain the total well-being produced by a 
policy option by measuring the strength of preference of affected parties for or against its 
realization by their willingness to pay for measures. But: 
 
It is implausible to assume that the satisfaction of preferences as such is either 
constitutive of welfare or leads to an increase of welfare. (…) I might prefer to smoke 
in the absence of knowledge of its health effects. Had I been fully informed my 
preferences would have been otherwise, and the satisfaction of raw preferences 
might lead to a decrease, not an increase in well-being. (…) What matters in the 
valuations is not the preference, but the quality of reasons and information (O’Neill, 
1997: 517).  
 
The neoclassical approach to environmental problems, on the contrary, neglects the 
influence of information and of debating reasons on individual preference formulation. The 
intensity of preferences is considered as the only way people have of expressing what 
they want.  
                                               
4
 See the references listed in O’Neill (1997: 546).  
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Second, valuing environmental goods is considered necessary in order to decide 
among conflicting objectives. The claim here is that given the existence of competing 
objectives in environmental policies, resolution requires some common measure of 
comparison. For example, when managing a forest, conflicts can arise between objectives 
of biodiversity preservation, of wood production, of recognition of cultural values attached 
to the forest. In the neoclassical approach the way to solve the conflict is through 
comparing costs and benefits of different forest management measures. This implies 
putting a price not only on biodiversity but also on people’s attachment to forests as part 
of their identity. This implies not considering that in real life not all objectives are tradeable 
and that social relations exist (including relations to the environment) that are constituted 
by refusing to put a price on them (Espeland and Stevens, 1998).  
As I will discuss in greater depth in the next paragraph, the neoclassical approach to 
environmental damage has been criticised as reductionist within the field of economic 
theory, because of its denial of the specific moral and political problems raised by 
environmental issues. A broader understanding of the rationality of public decision 
processes, not limited to market rationality, is claimed as necessary when the 
environment is involved.  
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The neoclassical economic approach to environmental damage has been radically 
critiqued by economists, usually with an institutionalist background, interested in 
developing alternative interpretations of economic action and in critiquing the paradigm of 
homo oeconomicus. The theoretical challenge environmental damage represents for 
neoclassical economics has been openly assumed and investigated (see: Martinez-Alier, 
1987).  
Two main charges are levelled at the way neoclassical economics deals with 
environmental issues. First, the relations existing between human beings and their 
environment are complex, and this complexity cannot be grasped through economic tools 
alone. These tools can deal only with a part of the relevant interactions accounting for 
environmental degradation, that is, those interactions that can fit a market frame. This 
implies that collective decisions on environmental issues call for a multidisciplinary 
approach. Second, allocative efficiency cannot be considered as the only way to define 
the collective interest when the environment is involved. As pointed out by William K. 
Kapp, considered one of the conceptual founders of the heterodox approach of ecological 
economics, environmental externalities are not a case of market failure but a failure of the 
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market as a cognitive, moral and material frame to deal with the environment (Kapp, 
1970).  
The critical approach to environmental damage developed by Kapp is of particular 
interest, because it offers a basis for a more “realistic” definition of what environmental 
damage is, why it is produced, how it can be internalized (Swaney and Evers, 1989; 
Luzzati, 2005; Franzini, 2006). In fact, Kapp adopts an approach which considers the 
economy as an open system. As a result, three issues are made visible that open an 
opportunity for cross-fertilisations with a sociological approach. 
First of all, Kapp identifies the origin of externalities in the “fiction” of the “economic 
sphere” as a closed sphere. This fiction rests upon market value considered as the only 
possible definition of value. If we consider the economy as an open system, then 
alternative definitions of what constitutes value have to be taken into account. “Social use 
value” is, for example, a definition of the value Kapp suggests and which rests upon 
issues of preservation of environmental equilibriums and satisfaction of human beings’ 
fundamental needs. Since the market cannot take into account these plural ways to define 
what constitutes value, we need other forms of evaluation and of social and political 
determinations of the social use value, involving different forms of knowledge about the 
environment and the interactions human beings have with it. The plurality of ways to 
define what constitutes value goes in tandem with different desirable collective goals to be 
pursued: allocative efficiency is just one of them. That is why “deliberative, i.e., political 
decisions” are needed in order to evaluate “environmental requirements in comparison to 
other public goals to be pursued” (Kapp, 1963: 317).  
Second, Kapp associates the existence of externalities to the question of legitimacy. 
In his view, externalities are in fact produced by a form of “cost shifting” (from economic 
activities of production to the environment) which is considered legitimate in our societies. 
In this sense, the definition of social and environmental rights, and, more generally, forms 
of political critique, in modifying or challenging the terms of legitimacy, can reduce the 
social acceptability of the cost shifting, helping to develop forms of internalization.  
Third, the question of legitimacy is connected by the author to the question of 
“conventional measurements of performance” and of indicators used as a basis for public 
decisions impacting the environment (Kapp, 1950: vii). Kapp stresses the epistemic 
complexity characterizing environmental damage. This implies the need to take into 
account a wide variety of indicators in order to decide on environmental issues. Besides 
economic indicators, social and natural indicators have to be considered as a knowledge 
base for the decision. Still, no easy synthesis is possible, because the different kinds of 
social and environmental cost are incommensurable. Economic tools based on monetary 
equivalences cannot offer a synthesis of the actual costs-benefits trade-off really at stake. 
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The complexity of the social and environmental implications of decisions impacting the 
environment can thus not be expressed through “synthetic measures”, which usually hide 
forms of power abuse (apud Luzzati, 2005: 11).  
To summarize, Kapp emphasizes the political content of the work of what neoclassical 
economics calls “internalization”; at the same time, Kapp is critical of the entire idea of 
externality, since the external-internal divide is defined by neoclassical economics 
considering the market as the “internal” to which all kinds of relation between human 
beings and the environment should adapt. On the contrary, Kapp’s analysis points to the 
dimensions of uncertainty and plurality brought to the fore by environmental damage: 
uncertainty (epistemic), because of the wide variety of natural and social processes that 
have to be explored, researched and taken into account as relevant in the public decision 
concerning environmental issues; plurality in the definition of what constitutes the value of 
the environment. These different forms of valuing the environment rest upon the definition 
of a plurality of valuable goals to be pursued collectively.  
In the next paragraph I will address the critical points raised by Kapp, re-interpreting 
them in the frame of a sociological approach to environmental damage. Understanding the 
processes of social definition of externalities is relevant in order to comprehend not only 
how environmental damage is defined in our societies but also what is at stake when we 
talk about internalization.  
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Using the category of externality to deal with environmental damage can produce a 
distorted vision of the problems at stake, as Kapp’s critical approach clearly shows. At the 
same time, analyzing environmental damage as negative externalities to be internalized 
can be a good heuristic. However, using the concept of externality as a heuristic requires 
a deeper understanding of the external-internal divide which defines the very essence of 
externalities.  
I propose to explore this external-internal divide by means of a pragmatic sociological 
approach, according to which the dynamic from the external to the internal can be 
analysed as a process of construction of a “world in common”.5 This construction implies 
                                               
5
 The pragmatic approach I adopt in my analysis is that associated with the work of Michel Callon and Bruno 
Latour and of Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot over the past decade (Callon and Latour, 1981; Thévenot, 
1990; Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006). This approach is also referred to as the “new French pragmatic 
sociology” (Silber, 2003) and it is linked to a wider “pragmatic turn” of the French social sciences occurring in 
the 1990s (Dosse, 1999). For a synthetic presentation of this approach see Bénatouïl (1999) and Breviglieri 
and Stavo-Debauge (1999). It is important to specify that French pragmatic sociology was not directly 
influenced by American pragmatism, even if later connections have been drawn in particular with John 
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the definition of more or less conventional resources (objects, laws, rules, indicators, 
routines, arrangements) meant to help agents in building a community of perspectives on 
the way to coordinating with other agents and the environment (Dodier, 1993). This 
approach recognizes a plurality of ways in which agents are related to the environment. 
These different relations to the environment are actively formatted by agents, in order to 
guarantee the achievement of valuable collective goals. 
A good starting point for discussing externalities from a sociological perspective is 
Kapp’s argument linking externalities to the construction of the economic sphere as a 
“closed sphere”, an argument which has a lot in common with Karl Polanyi’s analysis of 
the disembeddedness of the market economy (Ophuls, 1977).  
In The Great Transformation (1944), Polanyi advances an interesting analysis 
according to which the logics of “economic liberalism”, imposing the separation of the 
economic sphere, find themselves confronted with a movement of “social protection” (or 
conservation) which becomes manifest through the organised action of those people more 
directly affected by the negative consequences of market activities. What Polanyi offers us 
is, in fact, a sort of theory of market externalities internalization based on the principle of 
the “double movement”: the legitimacy of measures adopted according to the market 
model is challenged by the organized actions of those people suffering negative 
consequences. Through their struggle, the market can be – so to say – “re-embedded”.  
With a similar approach but trying to go beyond the automatism of Polanyi’s analysis –
in which the “double movement” is considered as an “unconscious” resistance of the 
social – Michel Callon has proposed that the concept of externalities to be revisited in 
terms of “overflows” (Callon, 1998a, 1998b; Callon et al., 2001). We can summarize his 
analysis as follows: negative externalities are non-calculated market costs which affect 
agents who react by mobilizing publicly so as to produce the conditions for the recognition 
of the damage suffered. Thus, the market undergoes a re-organization – that is, an 
internalisation is produced. In Callon’s view this re-organization produces a de-
naturalization and re-politicization of the market.  
This approach to externalities considers the process of internalization as a process of 
formation of a “public”. With a similar perspective to that developed by Dewey (1927, 
1938), those people affected by negative consequences of a “problematic situation” 
constitute themselves as a “public”, that is, a collective actor who, through a process of 
inquiry, explores the problems experienced. Callon stresses the political relevance of 
externalities as political situations where problems are defined and explored and a 
community is called to deliberate on what has to be considered as a public problem and 
how to deal with it.  
                                                                                                                                              
Dewey’s work (Karsenti and Quéré, 2004). 
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On the other hand, from Callon’s perspective, externality is a useful concept because 
it reveals the “social construction of the market” (Callon, 1998b: 244): externalities show 
that the market is a socio-technical construction. In fact, in order for the market to 
guarantee coordination, a specific frame of the situation is necessary. This means that the 
relations existing between human beings and the environment have to be put into an 
appropriate form for the market to work: this form is the one allowing calculativeness. As 
Callon argues: “calculating (…) is a complex collective practice” (Callon, 1998a: 4), which 
means that reality has to be equipped and prepared in the right shape so as to make 
calculation (and the market) work.  
In this respect, externalities highlight both the socio-technical construction of the 
market as a specific framing of coordination (among agents and with the environment) 
and the unavoidable existence of “overflows”. Callon’s analysis focuses on the socio-
political processes of overflow identification and framing, that is, the socio-technical 
processes by means of which what economists call externalities are socially defined and 
dealt with. This issue is not included in the neoclassical economic analysis of externalities, 
which assumes the self-evidence of externalities, ignoring the work of their formatting. On 
the contrary, Callon’s approach develops Kapp’s suggestion that dealing with externalities 
means dealing with how conventional measurements of performance and indicators for 
public decisions are defined.  
In Callon’s analysis of overflow identification and framing, two processes are 
entwined. First, the production of knowledge about overflows, meant to help put them into 
a format which enables public decision. Second, the political mobilization of those people 
who are affected by the overflowing. Taking as examples environmental risk cases (OGM, 
nuclear radiation, chemical pollution), Callon emphasizes the scant self-evidence of 
environmental damage and the work of inquiry necessary to produce proof and evidence 
of the negative effects affecting people and their environment. In this sense, what 
economists define and study as negative externalities are already the output of a socio-
technical process which gives shape to an occurrence of damage recognised as such in 
the public space.  
The identification and framing of overflows are usually the object of public 
controversies. These controversies concern categories, tools and indicators which are 
used to define cause-effect relations, to measure damage, to identify victims. This work of 
framing takes place in “hybrid forums” (Callon, 1998b), that is, spaces of deliberation 
where experts, public decision-makers and citizens debate damage definition. These 
controversies indicate the absence of a reliable knowledge base to identify and deal with 
externalities.  
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Experts (and expert knowledge) play an important role in providing legitimate and 
public categories to frame overflows. At the same time, Callon stresses the fact that 
framing environmental damage challenges expert knowledge. Environmental damage is 
the product of a complex web of interdependencies that cannot be grasped through the 
standardized and formal categories and tools of laboratory sciences. Different, “lay” forms 
of knowledge of the environment are crucial in order to define the type and extent of 
environmental damage, and how to intervene in order to internalize it.  
Callon’s analysis, then, is centred on the aspect of epistemic uncertainty surrounding 
environmental damage. The definition of environmental damage is analysed by Callon as 
a socio-technical process of collective reduction-containment of epistemic uncertainty 
through the definition of a knowledge base which includes a variety of forms of 
knowledge: the idea of a “hybrid forum” as the place where controversies are settled 
points in this direction.  
As I have already pointed out, this reduction-containment is particularly complex to 
achieve when the environment is involved, because environmental damage can be 
defined in relation to different specifications of the relevant human-environment 
interdependencies to be taken into account, for example from those more grounded 
locally to those which are defined more globally (Godard, 2000). These different 
interdependencies are linked to different “formats of information” (Thévenot, 1997) which 
translate them into actual knowledge. We are then confronted with different kinds of 
knowledge: general scientific knowledge detached from the specific case and intended for 
broad circulation; local knowledge, embedded in familiar surroundings and shared through 
proximity relations.  
As remarked by Wynne (1996: 59), in this dichotomy of local-general knowledge, 
“social assumptions and models”, “social prescriptions”, as well as “tacit forms of social 
order, relationships and identities”, are at stake. There is a dimension of power involved in 
the definition of the legitimate knowledge for public decision. This is the aspect Kapp 
refers to as a struggle for legitimacy, which is, in turn, linked to the issue of “different 
constructions of what constitutes value” confronting each other in the arenas where the 
framing of overflows takes place. This aspect is marginally addressed in Callon’s analysis, 
when he assumes that victims of environmental damage mobilize in hybrid flora so as to 
adjust and correct the market frame in order to include demands for “more justice” (Callon 
et al., 2001).  
The question of the plurality of definitions of the desirable collective goals to be 
pursued needs to be addressed in greater depth, since the very same definition of 
externalities as “negative” implies a common moral view that cannot be taken for granted 
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but ought to be considered as a crucial part of the socio-technical construction of 
externalities. 
To summarize, what Callon points to as a distinctive aspect of environmental damage 
is the high level of epistemic uncertainty to be dealt with. In particular, the main issue is 
the definition of the relevant knowledge to assess environmental problems and to decide 
collectively as to their treatment. As a result, Callon is particularly interested in exploring 
the different ways in which local knowledge can succeed in being recognised as a form of 
public knowledge, through an articulation with scientific knowledge. At the same time, he 
endeavours to define procedures which can help the dialogue between experts and lay 
people in hybrid flora, so as to foster the production of inclusive forms of public knowledge 
and decision on environmental damage.  
However, Callon’s analysis is weak in addressing two relevant questions, entangled in 
the process of negative externality definition and internalisation: first of all, the place of the 
market (and calculativeness) as the frame to regulate overflows and the relation of the 
market with other legitimate frames of regulation and evaluation; second, the moral 
dimension involved in the definition of “negative externalities”, since the very same 
definition of “negative” implies a judgement and an evaluation about what can be 
considered as good.  
As discussed in the next paragraph, the difficulties in settling controversies concerning 
environmental externalities are not only linked to the epistemic complexity characterizing 
environmental problems but also to the dimension of moral complexity involved in the 
process of defining environmental damage.  
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The concept of “critical uncertainty” developed by Boltanski and Thévenot in On 
Justification (2006; Thévenot, 1989) can be particularly useful in exploring how epistemic 
uncertainty is linked to forms of disagreement on the moral criteria relevant in defining and 
settling problematic situations.  
The justification approach originates in the empirical study of disputes involving 
people and things, when people have recourse to the most legitimate forms of evaluation 
to frame their arguments in public and put them to a test. These forms of evaluation are 
called by the authors "orders of worth". Each order of worth places value on a specific 
mode of relation with our social and natural environment. 
According to Boltanski and Thévenot’s justification approach, “there is not just one 
way of making value” but “multiple principles of evaluation”: “orders of worth are not 
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values counterposed to value but are constitutive of value. Orders of worth are the very 
fabric of calculation, of rationality, of value” (Stark, 2009: 22). From this perspective, 
market is indeed one of the organizing principles of our society but, in addition to a market 
rationality, modern society also has an industrial or technological rationality, another 
organized around a civic logic, and others arrayed according to principles of loyalty, 
inspiration and renown.  
Orders of worth are not specific to distinct spheres of activity. The market order is not 
the order of worth of the economic sphere. Each of the orders of worth can be salient in a 
given situation. This implies that markets in real life never work according to what the 
market rationality model would lead us to expect. They are always characterized by the 
co-presence of different rationalities at work.  
In this frame, moral uncertainty is, then, linked to the existence in our societies of 
different legitimate ways to define what constitutes value, that is, in the specific case of 
environmental issues, of qualifying the environment as a “good”. This plurality implies that 
the environment can be qualified as patrimonial heritage, linked to the history and 
traditional way of life of a community; as a landscape, valuable according to an aesthetic 
criterion; as endowed with symbolic value; as a pool of resources with a price defined 
through the market; as a dimension of the human condition to which rights are linked; as a 
space to be planned according to principles of efficient organisation of different functions. 
A specific environment can be valued according to each of these moral criteria, defining 
what constitutes its value (Thévenot et al., 2000; Godard, 2000, 2003). Symmetrically, the 
definition of what constitutes an occurrence of environmental damage is thereby non-
univocal.   
Assuming this condition of critical uncertainty linked to the existence of different ways 
to define what constitutes value implies taking seriously into account the dimension of 
incommensurability characterizing problematic situations as morally critical situations: “As 
coherent principles of evaluation, each of the orders of worth has distinctive and 
incommensurable principles of equivalence. Each defines the good, the just, and the fair – 
but according to different criteria of judgement (Stark, 2009: 23). 
As a result, if we consider externalities as morally critical situations, internalisation 
implies not just a re-framing of the market, through finding a way to translate it into a 
calculative format (basically, a way to commensurate) different kinds of relations to others 
and to the environment; internalisation is first of all a process of building “compromises”6 
between different orders of worth coexisting in the same situation. This construction of 
                                               
6
 In the justification approach, “compromise” is not a temporary agreement between individual interests: it is a 
true “composition” of different justification criteria which gives birth to a new, “composed” normative criterion 
(Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006). 
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compromises takes into account and deals with incommensurability without setting 
commensurability as a goal, at the same time drawing up a shared frame in which 
collective decisions can be made. The internal-external divide is, then, re-defined in this 
perspective in terms of the presence/absence of collective frames of regulation of the 
relations between human beings and their environment, guaranteeing what is recognized 
as a valuable collective goal. These frames of regulation can include elements of 
calculativeness and market coordination, but in a compromise with other orders of worth. 
They are crafted through public discussion and deliberation concerning reasons and 
justifications for public decision. 
Epistemic uncertainty and moral uncertainty are two dimensions of uncertainty we 
should keep analytically separated, but they are entangled. In fact epistemic uncertainty 
(meaning the uncertainty concerning the relevant knowledge which will allow a decision to 
be made on a problematic situation) is linked to moral uncertainty. If agreement on the 
frame for moral judgement concerning what constitutes value is missing, then 
controversies on what is the relevant knowledge (and the relevant agents) for the 
collective decision are impossible to settle. At the same time, once the moral frame is 
defined, the high level of epistemic uncertainty characterizing environmental damage, and 
which can cause the failure of institutional arrangements, opens up the possibility for a 
critique of these same arrangements. The critique can point to the need to improve the 
performance of these arrangements (the moral assumptions incorporated in the 
arrangements are not contested) or to define a new type of arrangement (the moral 
assumptions incorporated into the arrangements are contested).  
The orders of worth we have discussed until now define a “horizontal pluralism” 
concerning public and legitimate repertoires of evaluation and judgement. Starting from 
the work on justification, Thévenot has developed the approach of “regimes of 
engagement” which emphasizes a different type of moral complexity, of particular interest 
when dealing with environmental issues: a “vertical pluralism” (Thévenot, 2006). This 
second type of pluralism highlights the relevance in our societies, besides the plurality of 
legitimate orders of worth guiding justifiable action, of more personalised and localised 
moral criteria defined as such by agents in their engagement of proximity and familiarity 
with a specific environment (Thévenot, 1990, 2001, 2007). In particular, the moral criteria 
guiding the familiar engagement of a person with his/her environment are defined as such 
in the experience of living in - and being familiar with - an environment, and they can be 
shared only if the very same experience of attachment to the environment is shared. 
Being based on familiarity and proximity, these moral criteria cannot be applied when 
problems are discussed in terms of public problems potentially affecting everybody. When 
public problems are at stake, “generality” (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006) is a main feature 
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defining the legitimacy of arguments. To make proximity goods acknowledgeable to others 
in discussions of public problems, it is necessary to find a way to compose them with 
public and legitimate criteria of judgement and evaluation.  
As argued by Stavo-Debauge and Trom (2004) in discussing Dewey’s theory of the 
public, the “problematic situation” is always at first experienced as a “trouble” altering 
proximity attachments. Only in a second moment do troubles undergo a redefinition in 
order to be expressed and reconstructed, during the inquiry process, in a format that 
allows for public judgement and evaluation. Legitimate common goods which are under 
threat in the specific situation are articulated with proximity concerns.7 
When dealing with environmental damage, the ways to define value based on 
proximity are crucial, since the environment, before being publicly valuable in terms of 
patrimonial heritage, resources and rights, is what materially surrounds the agent as a 
space of proximity and familiarity, where attachments guaranteeing the consistency of the 
person are anchored (Breviglieri, 2002). When dealing with environmental issues, it is 
particularly important to take into account and explore this dimension of proximity in which 
the trouble generated by the problematic situation is first experienced. In fact, sometimes 
environmental disturbances affect the person so acutely that “voice” (Hirschman, 1970) is 
highly demanding, and sometimes impossible. Hybrid flora requires such an active stance 
without considering the resources (even those of an emotional nature) and capabilities (of 
argumentation) agents need to have. Moreover, sometimes environmental troubles cannot 
find an easy way to access the public space in terms of public issues: forms of “vicious 
extensions” of these moral criteria of proximity -in terms, for example, of communitaristic 
claims- can emerge (Centemeri, 2006: ch.4).   
As suggested by Callon, the definition of environmental externalities and their 
internalization should take place in regulated spaces of deliberation: they are intended as 
public arenas in which “translations” occur, that is, processes of definition of chains of 
equivalence (Callon and Latour, 1981). At the same time, they are spaces of epistemic 
and moral complexity in which issues of incommensurability have to be dealt with. This 
requires in particular paying attention to the conditions implicitly or explicitly defined for the 
inclusion in these deliberative arenas. Are these arenas really designed and equipped to 
make possible the inclusion of experiences and voices relating concerns and troubles 
which are not straightaway in the appropriate format for entering the public debate? Do 
deliberation processes also concern the very same definition of what has to be considered 
as “negative” and as damage, not only taking into account the plurality of legitimate orders 
                                               
7
 In the case study they discuss of the citizen mobilisation for the preservation of the Vieux Lyon quarter, the 
authors show how, through reference to “patrimonial heritage”, a group of militants succeeds in composing the 
local concerns of inhabitants threatened by an urban renovation plan involving a radical transformation of their 
familiar space, with a collective interest in the preservation of an artistic heritage site of world interest. 
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of worth but also the moral dimension involved in engagements of proximity affected by 
environmental damage?  
Mediations (and mediators) are, then, needed to deal with incommensurability and the 
impossibility of a generalized trade-off. This implies work designed to make publicly visible 
several legitimate moral perspectives without aiming at their reduction to a common 
denominator, but helping making moral assumptions explicit and part of the deliberative 
process. At the same time, compositions are needed to bring the relevance of proximity 
goods into the public discussion, articulating them with public concerns. This implies a 
capacity of the mediator to be, at the same time, familiar with the environment and 
detached from it. This double condition is necessary in order to evaluate how differently 
environmental damage affects persons, threatening goods defined as such in the 
experience of engagements of proximity as well as in the public space (Richard-Ferroudji, 
2008). 
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The concept of negative externalities is the dominant frame in environmental policies. In 
this paper I have discussed the neoclassical economic approach to environmental 
damage, showing, by means of a critical analysis developed within the field of economics, 
the risks of reductionism implied by such an approach. Considering efficiency as the only 
desirable collective goal to be pursued, economic theory has no means by which to detect 
and analyse the presence, in externality situations, of conflicting definitions of what 
constitutes value. Besides market efficiency, other evaluation criteria to define what is a 
collective good or bad are relevant in externality situations.  
The approach of neoclassical economics prevents us from taking into account the 
political nature of externality situations. Revisiting externalities by means of a sociological 
approach, I have shown how the process of externality definition and internalisation can 
be analysed as a political process in which a public is constituted and common problems 
are collectively defined and addressed. In particular, I have highlighted the presence in 
this process of two kinds of uncertainty which have to be dealt with: an epistemic 
uncertainty and a moral uncertainty.  
The epistemic uncertainty raises the question of the relation existing between lay and 
expert knowledge in defining the legitimate knowledge base for public decision. The moral 
uncertainty is related to the existence of a plurality of definitions by which something is 
valued as a good or as a bad. In particular, I have pointed out the relevance of two 
sources of moral complexity:  the existence of different orders of worth, according to which 
what is good is publicly defined, and the existence, besides these public moral criteria for 
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evaluation, of more local criteria of judgement, anchored in the experience of proximity to 
the environment.  
The two kinds of uncertainty (epistemic and moral) are strictly intertwined. Still, 
keeping these two forms of uncertainty analytically separated is useful in order specifically 
to analyse the different types of translation, mediation and composition (at epistemic and 
moral levels) which are needed in order to create the conditions for a truly inclusive and 
democratic public deliberation on environmental damage, its definition, repairing and 
prevention.  
The economic tools designed for dealing with externalities, with their emphasis on 
commensurability, are deeply inadequate to promote a reduction of epistemic and moral 
uncertainty which could allow for a truly inclusive composition of plural ways to value the 
environment. In this sense, the neoclassical approach to externalities can be not only 
misleading in addressing the problems at stake but it can produce a situation of lack of 
democracy regarding how environmental problems are defined as collective. Public 
decision processes concerning environmental issues have to be designed so as to take 
into account different stances concerning not only the relevant knowledge base for 
decision-making but also the very definition of what can be considered as an 
environmental good or bad. 
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